




The Potential Role of Price Insurance to Improve Welfare of  






Nancy McCarthy* and Yan Sun* 
 










Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 











Copyright 2004 by Nancy McCarthy and Yan Sun.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
   
 ABSTRACT 
 
Coffee is the major export crop in Honduras, but the export price is relatively low. This 
paper investigates the potential role for a coffee price insurance product - based on the 
use of the coffee future market - to increasing producer welfare by reducing coffee price 
risk faced by individual farmers. By constructing a typology of six different types of 
coffee farmers and developing a forecasting model, the authors show that more risk-
averse farmers would prefer to buy the insurance contract than those with lower risk 
aversion. The subjective assessments analysis also show that Honduran coffee producers 
have optimistic expectations for coffee prices and appear to underestimate the variability 
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 1. Introduction 
 
          Of  the  6.5  million  inhabitants  in  Honduras,  nearly  80%  live  in  poverty.    The 
average Honduran family, lives on less than $1,000 US per year (HTH 2003). Poverty in 
rural areas is worse still, and absolute numbers and proportion of households living in 
poverty in the rural areas has been increasing in recent years.  Many observers believe 
that one of the key causes of worsening rural poverty in Honduras – and indeed in Latin 
America more generally – has been the precipitous decline in coffee prices realized by 
producers.   Even today, coffee is the second most important export crop in Honduras in 
value terms, and is thus a major source of international revenue, representing almost a 
quarter of the country’s gross domestic product (Partners 2003). Hondurans produces 
mainly Arabica coffee.  Total production has increased steadily since 1981, reaching 
3,3913,460 quintals (1 quintal = 100 pounds), with an average yield of 15 quintal/ha on 
an average farm size of 2.9 ha (Varangis et al. 2003).  
          Much of the coffee in Honduras is grown by small-scale producers in the more 
isolated, high altitude locations; with 92% of the coffee producers’ annual production less 
than 100 quintals per farm (Ibid. 2003). Yet, although Honduras has considerable acreage 
and labor force dedicated to coffee cultivation, its international market share and export 
price are both relatively low compared to other Central American countries (Partners 
2003). Farmers also sell the majority of their production to intermediaries.  Quality is also 
of concern; Honduras coffee suffered penalties anywhere between 5 and 15 cents per 
pound on the world market in the past two years (Hearne et al. 2002; Partners 2003).   
Combined with internal factors associated with low relative prices, during 2000 
and 2001, worldwide supply caused coffee prices to drop to their lowest levels in 30 
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 years, or, to a 100 year low, if adjusted for inflation (Varangis et al. 2003).  Since the 
middle of 2001, the nominal Arabicas coffee price (“other mild” category, which 
Honduras coffee belong to, though at a discount) in international market has declined to 
below 60 US cents per pound (ICO).   Yet, world coffee prices have been declining – in 
both nominal and real terms since at least the mid-1970’s; real coffee prices have 
markedly declined in recent years in Honduras due to high inflation rates of the past few 
years, but even nominal prices have been declining.  Oddly enough, domestic production 
has been expanding over the past twenty or so years – precisely when prices have been 
falling.  Since Honduras is really too small to affect world coffee prices, it remains a 
mystery as to why production has expanded so much – increasing by more than 2.5 times 
over the period 1981 – 2001.  Certain explanations have been given for fall in the world 
price of coffee, e.g. the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989 or 
the continued expansion of world supplies, particularly by new entrants such as Vietnam, 
in the 1990’s.  But, these explanations fall short of explaining the rather dramatic fall of 
real coffee prices during 1975-1989, before the collapse of the ICA or, more importantly 
for this study, the dramatic rise in domestic production in still relatively low-production 
countries like Honduras.   
        In order to baseline the simulation model developed below, certain questions on 
farmers’ perceptions of yield and price risk for coffee and maize were included on a large 
survey of farm households in Honduras.  Under the project titled “Rural Development 
Policies and Sustainable Land Use in the Hillsides of Honduras”, the International Food 
Research Institute (IFPRI), in association with Wageningen University and Research 
Center (WUR) and the National Program for Sustainable Rural Development 
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 (PRONADERS) of the Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG) in Honduras, 
undertook a farm survey in 9 provinces and 19 counties of Honduras. Their collaborator 
EAS collected data between November 2001 and May 2002 for 376 farm households in 
these hillsides regions of Honduras, where 91% of the population has incomes of less 
than $1.00 per capita per day. There are total 68 coffee farmers in the survey, their 
average coffee yield is 7.74 quintal/ha, which is almost half of the national standard 
mentioned previously – and Honduran national yields are lower than the Central 
American averages to begin with (Varangis et al. 2003). The annual overall average 
income is US$ 728 per household (exchange rate based on 1 US$ = 15.8 Lempira).  
          In  Jansen  et  al.,  the  authors cluster households based on the asset portfolios, 
resulting in six types of rural households: smallest basic grains farms, small basic grains 
farms, medium basic grains farms, coffee farms, medium livestock farms, and large 
livestock farms. The 48 coffee farm households have the second highest average total 
income due to coffee production and relatively high off-farm earnings. The average farm 
size for this cluster is 7 hectares. Annual total income is US$ 969 and per capital income 
is US$ 179. Medium livestock farm households have the highest average total income, at 
US $2,193; and a number of these farm households also produce coffee. Livestock 
activities and off-farm activities, together with coffee production, result in high average 
income. 
         The coffee farmers at Honduras face at least two problems associated with coffee 
prices: declining coffee price and volatility of the price (Varangis et al. 2003).  It is the 
hypothesis of this study that they can improve their situation by buying insurance 
contracts whose parameters are tied to trading opportunities in the international coffee 
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 market. Coffee is traded in both spot and futures markets; futures and options are traded 
on “C” contract of the New York Board of Trade, which calls for delivery of washed 
Arabic coffee (CRB 2002).   
In the remainder of the paper, we will develop appeal to a simple theoretical 
model of the willingness to pay for insurance in order to construct an simulation model, 
present results for the forecasts of expected coffee prices and various futures contracts, 
and finally present results from a simulation analysis of the willingness to pay for coffee 
price insurance.    
 
2.  Model Development & Hypothetical Insurance Contracts 
2a.  Model Development 
        In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model of the willingness to pay for 
coffee price insurance.   Following the standard willingness to pay literature, we consider 
the willingness to pay to be equal to the difference between a person’s utility with the 
insurance and her utility without the insurance, written as follows: 
( ) ( )
* * ()
I I NI NI WTP EU Y EU Y δ =−        ( 1 )  
Where EU is expected utility; Y is income; δ  is a discount factor reflecting the fact that 
payment for the insurance contract is made at the beginning of the period and income is 
realized at the end of the period; the superscripts, I and NI, stand for the insurance vs. no-
insurance cases, respectively; and  .  Income is comprised of 
three sources: coffee revenues: , grain crop revenues, 
and off-farm income, 
* () m a x ()
ii ii EU Y EU Y =
1
cf
cf cf cf cf cf PQ Px c x
γ π == − 1
2 2
gn
gn gn gn gn gn PQ Px c x
γ π == − Off π . (P  is domestic price for coffee 
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 and grain crop respectively; x is input; γ  is technical parameter for coffee and grain 
crop respectively). Coffee and grain crops are risky activities, and both prices and 
quantities produced vary.    In the simulation model, we use a mean-variance 
approximation to expected utility.  The no insurance maximization problem is given: 
__ __ __ __
2 1
12 2 1, 2 max ( ) NI
NI NI
cf cf cf gn gn gn Off Y xx EU Y P Q c x P Q c x π φσ =− +− + −    (2) 
Where bars over the variables indicated expected values, φ   is the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion, and 
2
NI Y σ  is the variation in income.   
        For the insurance case, we assume that farmers insure their entire (expected) output; 
the maximization problem is given below: 
____ __ __ __
2 1
12 2 1, 2 max ( ) I
I I
cf cf cf gn gn gn Off Y xx EU Y VC Q c x P Q c x π φσ =− + − + −     (3) 
The above expression differs from that in Eq. (2) by the term,   , which is the 




I Y σ , which is the variance of income with 
the insurance contract (here we only consider the insurance contract for coffee). 
       As we will see below, the price of coffee and the quantity of coffee produced are not 
correlated, nor are the price of grain (which we proxy with maize) and the quantity of 




cf cf cf cf cf P Q cf Q cf P Var E P E Q π σσ σ σ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ,  
and similarly for the variance of grain income.  For the insurance case, we substitute the 
forecast value and variance; formulas given below following the estimations. Total 
income variance is given by thus given by the following standard formulation: 
22 2 2 i
cf mz cf mz Y π ππ π σ σσ ρ σ σ =++  
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 2b.  Expected Values, Variances and Forecasts 
        In this section, we present the results for the coffee and maize price equations, as 
well as for coffee and maize production.  For production data, we used FAO production 
data; coffee data is available for 1981-2002, and maize production from 1961-2002. Such 
a series is quite likely to be less variable than household-level realizations, nonetheless 
the data gives us a base estimate of output variance.    
  Below we present results for the production and price data, for coffee and maize.  
All equations were run as either ARIMA or mixed ARIMA-Regression equations using 
first-differenced dependent variables; we fail to reject stationarity for the first-difference 
series for all variables, using the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots
i.  As noted above, 
production data is yearly and is run in levels
ii.  World price data for coffee is the monthly 
series on spot prices for the “other mild” category of arabicas, in natural logs; domestic 
price data is also monthly and in natural logs
iii. 
 
Honduras Maize Production 
() ( ) ( ) ,, 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 , 3 (1.03) ( 2.62) ( 2.26) 5791.69 .310* .395* ; m zt m zt m zt m zt m zt m zt QQ Q Q Q Q −− − −− −= − −− − − −  
n=41 (1961-2002);  Prob >
2 χ =.07;   46066
mz Q σ =  
 
Honduras Coffee Production 
() ( ) ,, 1 , 1 , 2 (3.00) ( 1.77) 5833.18 .352* ; cf t cf t cf t cf t QQ Q Q −− − −= − − −  
n=21 (1981 – 2002); Prob >
2 χ =.0002;   11794
cf Q σ =   
Honduras Maize Price 
() ( ,, 1 , 4 , (1.68) (2.94) ln ln .092 .544* ln ln ; mz t mz t mz t mz t HP HP HP HP −− −= + − ) 5 −  
n= 29 (1966-1995);  Prob >
2 χ =.003;   ln .130
mz HP σ =    
 
Honduras Coffee Price 
( ) ( ) ( ) , ,1 , ,1 ,1 ,2 (.20) (7.41) ( 4.18) ln ln .0004 .56* ln ln .19 * ln ln ; cf t cf t cf t cf t cf t cf t HP HP WP WP HP HP −− − −= + −− − − −  
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 n= 222 (1982(2) – 2001(12));  Prob >
2 χ =.0000;   ln .14
cf HP σ =    
 
World Coffee Price 
() ( ) ,, 1 , 1 , ln ln .0035 .26* ln ln ; cf t cf t cf t cf t WP WP WP WP −− −= − + − 2 −  
  n=222 (1983(2) – 2002(12));  Prob >
2 χ =.0000;    ln .08
cf WP σ =  
 
   The only rather peculiar estimated model is for Honduras Maize price, where a 4
th-
order autoregressive lag, only, yielded the best 
2 χ .     For our purposes, the most striking 
result is the standard deviation of the Honduras and world coffee price series; Honduras 
price variability is nearly double that of the world price series. 
   As noted earlier, production data, based on national aggregates, is likely to under-
estimate the variability that smallholders actually face.  Nonetheless, we use the 
estimated coefficient of variation of production (.25 for maize and .21 for coffee), to 
baseline the model.   Also, the price of maize as provided by FAO is only available up to 
1995; we therefore used the variance from the price series but used the subjective 
prediction of the price of maize from the household survey. 
 The world coffee price follows an ARI(1,1,0) process, so we can write the forecast 
equation as the following: 
,1 , 1 cf t cf t t WP WP φ δε − ∆= ∆ + +  
where   represents WP , cf t WP ∆ ,, 1 cf t cf t WP − − ,1 cf t WP − ∆ ,   represents  ,1 ,2 cf t cf t WP WP − − − ,  1 φ  is the 
coefficient capturing the impact of last period’s price difference on this period’s 
difference, δ is a constant that determines, in part, the mean of the stochastic process, and 
t ε  is the error term.  Note that, for the series to be stationary,  1 φ <1, which holds for the 
estimated world price equation.  The N-month forecast and variance are calculated using 
the following formulas (Pindyck & Rubinfeld 1991): 
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  ,, 1 ,
Fcst
c ftl c ftl c ftl WP WP WP φ δ ++ + =+ ∆+  













⎡⎤ = ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ∑∑
Since prices are in natural logs, we then transform the forecast price and variance, 
following the formulas given in Greene (2000).    Honduras coffee prices were forecasted 
using the same procedure; but note that, in this case, the forecast depends on the world 
price, which itself is forecasted.  We forecast Honduras prices using the following 
equation: 
  ,, 1 , 1 ,
Fcst
cf t l cf t l cf t l cf t l HP HP WP HP β φδ ++ + + =+ ∆+ ∆ +  
The variance is calculated following the formula given above for the AR(1,1,0) world 
price equation.  In other words, we did not account for the additional variance introduced 
by using the forecasted world price to forecast the domestic price of coffee; the estimated 
variance, then, would be a lower-bound estimate.     
         Table 1 below gives the prevailing prices for Brazilian washed arabicas
iv and the 
domestic price of arabicas coffee in December 2001, and the forecast price and variance 
for 6, 9 & 12 months forecasts for domestic and world prices (where the latter refer to 
months before December 2002).  Table 2 gives the actual coffee prices obtaining in 
December 2001 and 2002. 
              The futures market on the New York Board of Trade offers contracts for “C” 
arabicas, for which Honduran coffee receives a substantial discount, of 100 points (CRB 
2002).  This makes it somewhat difficult to make a clean comparison between the 
NYBOT futures price and the relevant domestic market price for producers.  As in the 
spot market, Honduran coffee is discounted and this adds another source of risk (and, it is 
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 risky, because the discounts vary over time). As noted above, the futures price for a 12 
month “C” contract is 53.85 cents per pound, and the 9 month is 53.40 (NYBOT).  The 
implied volatility, obtained by applying Black’s model, is 47% for the 12 month contract, 
and 38% for the 9 month contract.  As expected, implied volatility is lower than historical 
spot price volatility; but, again this does not account for increased risk associated with 
quality discounts.  A decision was thus made to base hypothetical insurance contracts on 
the historical spot price, and not the future’s price. 
2c. Insurance Contracts 
       In this section, we present the hypothetical contracts used in the simulation analysis.  
There are three types of contracts.  First, following Sarris (2002), we consider that 
producer’s who purchase insurance will actually receive prices prevailing in the 
international markets.  We considered contracts with a strike price equal to the forecast 
price, as well as strike prices 10% above and below the forecast price, each for 12, 9 and 
6 months. 
 The assumption that producer’s will receive essentially the export price is quite a big 
assumption –  producers’ prices were 13% and 20% lower than the prevailing 
international spot price for Honduran coffee in December 2002 and December 2001, 
respectively.  The second set of contracts considers that producers would consider the 
mean and variance from the domestic producer price series to represent no insurance 
scenario; note that the mean is lower and variance higher than when we use the world 
price series for the no insurance scenario. For contract values, we assume that the 
variance of the insured contracts are those derived from the world price series as above.  
However, we assume that producers’ receive only a fraction of the world price, so that 
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 the expected values of the contracts are equal to a fraction of the contracts specified 
under the first set of contracts discussed above.  We assume the constant fraction is equal 
to 80%.  Finally, we use forecasts made by smallholders surveyed in Honduras in early 
2002; respondents were asked to give the most likely, the highest and the lowest prices 
they might receive in December, 2002.  Using formulae for triangle distributions, we 
recovered the expected price and variance of that price.    
 
3.  Simulation Model Results 
3a. Willingness to pay 
        Before presenting results of the willingness to pay, Table 3 presents total household 
income, and the coffee, maize, other crops and off-farm income for six types of 
households for which simulations were run.   
       As noted above, full data was available on only 47 households, but they still provide 
useful parameters with which to baseline the model.   Note that even “rich” households 
are quite poor.   In the model below, we have included maize as the only other 
agricultural crop since it is the major household staple crop.  It can be mentioned, 
however, that households are quite diversified in terms of number of crops produced, 
which may offer some risk-spreading benefits that are not accounted for in the model
v.   
For all three income categories, off-farm income forms a significant share of income for 
those households with low coffee shares.  In the simulation model, off-farm income is 
modeled as risk-free but fixed.   
       Table 4 below present results for the willingness to pay for the 6, 9 and 12 month 
insurance contracts based on the assumption that producers will receive predicted world 
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 prices, given that producers’ have constant relative risk aversion (CRR) =.9.  In Table 5, 
results are given for the same scenario, with the exception that CRR=.4
vi. 
        Looking first at Table 4, we see that with a relatively high coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, all producer’s would purchase the 12 month contract at fair value; many 
producer’s with large coffee income shares would pay 50% more than the fair value 
contract.  Fewer producers would pay for  the  9  month  contract;  here  only  the  poorest  
households and  those with  large coffee income  shares would  purchase the contract.  No 
households would purchase the 6 month contract at fair value
vii.  Furthermore, as shown 
in Table 5, when we assume a lower coefficient of relative risk aversion, fewer 
households would be willing to pay for fair value insurance contracts, though the 12 
months contracts are still preferred more often than the 6 and 9 month contracts.   
Interesting to note is that, whereas the willingness to pay as a share of the fair value 
contract usually decreases as the strike price increases, this is not so for the wealthiest 
producers with high coffee shares.  
Next, we present results for scenarios based on the domestic price series, for high and 
low CRR; these are given in Tables 6 and 7. 
       The main difference with the first set of contracts is that the expected price with no 
insurance and the expected values of the insurance contracts are all lower, but the 
reduction in variability vis-à-vis the no insurance case is more pronounced.  Nonetheless, 
these contracts are almost never valued greater than fair value for those households with 
low coffee income shares except the poorest and most risk-averse households.  Most 
households with large coffee income shares should be willing to pay more than fair value, 
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 especially for the 12-month contracts.  Nine-month contracts are only attractive to 
relatively risk-averse households.     
3b. Subjective Assessments: 
       Interviews  undertaken  between December 2001 and February 2002 included 
questions regarding the household head’s subjective assessment of the coffee prices for 
December 2002
viii.    The farmer was asked to give his assessment of the most likely 
price, as well as the best and least likely prices.  These values were used to construct a 
triangle distribution, from which estimates of expected value and variance coffee price 12 
months ahead were calculated.   Table 8 below presents data on prices just received, 
expected price 12 months ahead, the percent increase in expected vs. current prices, and 
variance of expected price.  For the 45 households for which price data is available (price 
per pound of coffee sold in this year’s harvest (in December 2001)), the average price just 
received was 34.04 cents per pound, very close to the producer’s price of 33.93 reported 
above.   Because of very few observations for the wealthy category, we combine these 
categories.  Interestingly, the medium and wealthy farmers received higher prices than 
did poor farmers.   
More striking is the fact that nearly all sub-groups of producers expected prices to be 
much higher in December 2002 than those prevailing in December 2001 – 25-50% higher 
– for all but the medium income, low share of coffee households who expected only a 5% 
increase.  The forecast price was just under 33 cents per pound, whereas the realized 
price was quite a bit higher, at just over 40 cents per pound.  Nonetheless, even the higher 
realized price was well below producers’ expected price.  Such high expectations may be 
a result of optimism, or respondents may have felt that they could influence government 
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 price support policy by stating what they considered to be a “fair” price; it would be 
worth looking into formation of price expectations more seriously if these types of 
insurance schemes are to be implemented. 
Finally, the variances recovered from the triangle distribution are very low indeed; 
the coefficient of variation is just .19.  This is likely to be, in part, an artifact of the 
double truncation of the triangle distribution, which may under-estimate true subjective 
assessment of the price distribution.  Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that those with 
lower share of coffee income perceive much lower price variance. 
       Given the higher than forecast expected prices, and the much lower variability, we 
already expect that producer’s with holding these subjective assessment would not be 
willing to pay for price insurance.  Table 9a below gives simulation results using values 
for expected price and variance from the above table, and values for insurance contracts 
based on receiving a 80% of the expected value of world price based contracts (as per the 
domestic price-based scenarios run immediately above); Table 9b gives results when 
using the producers’ subjective assessments of expected price, but where we then use the 
variance in price stemming from the domestic producer price series, which is higher than 
the variance of the insurance contracts, and of course, much higher than the variances 
recovered from the subjective assessments. 
       As can be seen above, not only is no one willing to pay for insurance if we use 
subjective assessments of expected price and variance, but in fact, they would have to be 
paid – quite substantially! – to take the insurance.   When we use actual variance of 
domestic prices as the relevant price variance under no insurance, still no category of 
farmers is willing to pay the fair value of insurance.  This indicates that it is not just the 
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 low subjective assessments of price variance driving the result, but is both the optimistic 
expectations over prices as well as the low assessed variance. 
3c.  Allowing producer’s to allocate agricultural inputs 
       In  the  next  set  of  simulations,  we allow the producer’s to choose optimal input 
allocations, but fix the total amount of off-farm income at different levels, USD 1000 and 
2000.  Given the risk parameters, it was not necessary to restrict total agricultural inputs 
to some fixed level; in other words, the level of risk and the parameterization of risk 
preferences nearly reproduce observed levels of total “aggregate” inputs, and total 
incomes realized, as in the above scenarios, where input levels were fixed.  The 
simulations also work a bit differently in that we allow producer’s to maximize expected 
utility either under the no-insurance scenario, or when forced to purchase the full 
insurance at the fair value premium price.  If expected utility is higher under no-
insurance, then producers’ will choose not to insure.  In the first scenario, we vary the 
premium price, so we can directly determine whether or not the producer will benefit by 
purchasing full insurance at the alternative prices, and check the premium price at which 
the producer is just willing to buy full insurance vs. no insurance.  In the other two 
scenarios, we change the expected value of the contract and change the discount rate.  In 
these cases, when insurance scenarios yield greater expected utility than the no insurance 
case, we calculate the additional amount producer’s would be willing to pay in addition 
to the fair value based on the difference between expected utility with and without 
insurance
ix.   
       Another  complication  is introduced  by  the  fact  that   costs   of coffee, as found in 
Varangis et al. (2003), are estimated at 36 cents per pound of output produced in the 
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 lowest cost, traditional systems.  However, this cost is quite close to the output price, 
leaving little room for returns to producers (land, human capital, etc.).  Since this set of 
scenarios is trying to capture long-run movements, it can be noted immediately that at 
costs of 36 cents per pound, no coffee will be grown unless producers’ output prices 
nearly double – insurance or no.  In order to generate scenarios more interesting than 
those repeatedly resulting in no coffee grown, we’ll assume that costs of producing coffee 
are 20 cents per pound.  This is similar to assuming that output prices rise, except that 
costs are non-stochastic whereas output prices are stochastic.   Also, with constant 
relative risk aversion of .9, close to no coffee will be grown – i.e. not more than $0.20 
gross value will be produced – by any farm households unless output prices more 
increase by more than 50%, input costs fall by more than 60%, or coffee income 
variability falls by more than 60%, or some combination of the above.   In other words, 
when the model allows for farmers to allocate agricultural inputs, this yields the result 
that, under current parameter values and relatively high risk aversion, no coffee will be 
grown.  In the long run, we would expect risk-averse producers to quit cultivating coffee, 
if relative profitability and income variability remained constant or worsened.  Finally, 
the poorest households, who have less than $200 a year from off-farm income annually, 
will nearly always move out of coffee even when they exhibit relatively low risk 
aversion, unless net profitability nearly doubles and/or variability decreases by more than 
75%.   Thus, in the scenarios below we only consider the medium and wealthy farm 
categories (recalling that “wealthy” farmers are still quite poor in absolute terms). 
  The scenarios are also based on the domestic price scenario   outlined above;   in   the  
baseline scenario, we assume that producers’ expected value of the insurance contract is 
80% of the value generated using the world price series.  We also discuss results for the 9 
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 month contracts only; 12 month contracts remain somewhat more likely to be preferred, 
and in these scenarios, 6 month contracts are never purchased.  We will also hereafter use 
OFY in place of off-farm income.   
Changing the Insurance Premium 
              As the insurance premium drops, more coffee will be produced, close to 75% 
increase for both types of producers, though slightly higher for those with greater OFY.  
Maize production also increases, but only by about 5%.  Results indicate that producers 
with low OFY would be willing to pay for insurance if the premium were about 4.5 cents 
per pound, or a premium/expected price ratio of .11; for those with greater off-farm 
income, insurance becomes attractive at a slightly higher premium.   
Increasing Producer Prices (reducing difference between producer prices and world 
prices): 
       As   with   decreasing the   premium, no insurance   would  be  purchased  under   the 
baseline proportion of 80%, but producers would be willing to purchase insurance if the 
proportion received rose to 84% for those with low off-farm income, and about 82% for 
those with high off-farm income.  This is equivalent to a premium/expected price ratio of 
.135 and .14 for low  and high OFY producers, respectively.  Coffee  production  expands 
by about 86% for both types of producers; maize production expands by 10% for low 
OFY producers, but only by 5% for high OFY producers. 
Reducing Variance of Expected Value of Insurance Contract 
       Reducing the variance of the insurance contract makes insurance attractive when the 
variance decreases by about 25% for low off-farm income producers, but need only drop 
by about 8% for insurance to become attractive to those with high off-farm income.   
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 Coffee production expands by about 80% for both producers; as in the previous 
scenarios, maize production expands by about 11% for low OFY producers and by about 
5% for high OFY producers.     
Reducing the Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion 
       Reducing  the  coefficient  of  absolute risk aversion leads to a decrease in the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion from .4 to about .2 for low OFY producers, and to a 
drop from .4 to about .14 for high OFY producers.  For low off-farm income producers, 
insurance becomes attractive only when the coefficient of relative risk aversion reaches 
.2.  For those with high off-farm income, the coefficient of relative risk aversion must 
reach .15 before insurance is preferred to the no-insurance case.  Coffee production 
expands by 83% and 92% for low and high OFY producers, respectively.  Unlike other 
scenarios, however, maize production also expands dramatically; by 60% for low OFY 
and 82% for high OFY producers.    
       To summarize, with no insurance – or insurance at baseline parameters – the mode 
predicts that nearly all households will move out of coffee, irrespective of whether the 
households “income” category (again recalling that even “wealthy” households are fairly 
poor by international standards).  Access to insurance contracts that are preferred to the 
no insurance case generally leads to an expansion of coffee and maize production; though 
the impact on maize production is fairly limited.  Apparently, relatively small changes in 
the proportion of world prices realized by domestic producers would make insurance 
contracts attractive; premium prices and variance of the contracts would have to change 
more dramatically – in percentage terms – in order for insurance contracts to remain 
viable in the long run.   However, these results hold only for producers with a relatively 
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 high safe income -- $1000 a year or more.  Poorer producers, even of only moderate risk 
aversion, simply won’t be able to manage the risks of coffee production even with 
insurance, unless expected price increases dramatically, premium prices are very low 
(e.g. because of subsidies), or the price insurance scheme can offer lower variability than 
that currently implied by the futures market.   
 
4. Concluding  Comments 
              Results of the analysis give some support to the contention that coffee price 
insurance would be attractive to smallholders in the short run, when input allocation is 
essentially fixed.   This would be particularly true for longer length contracts: 9 or 12 
months.  At current parameter values, however, insurance would not be preferred in the 
medium - long run, particularly by the very poor.  Of interest is the fact that increasing 
the proportion of the world price received by smallholders has a fairly substantial impact 
on coffee production and the value of insurance, and subsequently on total profits and 
expected utility.   Varangis et al. (2003) emphasize the potential importance of ensuring 
quality and brand merchandising a ways to capture a greater proportion of prevailing 
world price.  They note this is particularly true in Honduras where agro-ecological 
conditions and traditional growing methods at least provide the possibility that a greater 
proportion of world prices can be captured for domestic producers.  Of interest to note is 
that the while the poorest are willing to pay more for insurance when input allocation is 
fixed, they would not find insurance attractive at all if allowed to re-allocated inputs 
away from coffee.  Rather, the middle – wealthy smallholders are more likely to take 




                                                 
i All estimations were performed in STATA 8.0 
ii Whether variables are in levels or logs depends entirely on which variable is better 
explained by the ARIMA model, in terms of the Wald chi-square statistic.  Similarly, 
various lag structures were specified after visually inspecting the autocorrelation 
function, and the specification retained was for which the Prob>chi-square was the 
lowest. 
iii Because we are interested in forecasting the world and domestic price of coffee, we use 
the nominal price series; the coffee futures market that any insurance scheme would rely 
on is obviously in nominal prices.  Nonetheless, this assumption masks additional risks 
associated with domestic inflation; not to mention exchange rate risk; evaluating such 
risks is outside the scope of the present paper.  Estimates presented here can be 
considered upper-bound estimates of expected price, and lower-bound estimates of the 
variance of the insured crop. 
iv As noted above, Honduran arabicas are usually considered in the “other mild” category 
of coffees traded, but they also trade at a substantial discount.  In the recent past for 
which we have data, Honduran arabica’s generally traded closer to the Brazilian arabica 
price (Other Mild Price – Discount ≅  Brazilian Arabica).  Because we do not have 
information on this discount over the entire period 1981-2002, we decided to base our 
analysis on the Brazilian Arabica price series.  The two series are very highly correlated 
(Pearsson correlation coefficient = .96), and they also exhibit very similar volatility. 
v We can simulate the effects of reducing maize production variability, but given model 
parameters, willingness to pay for coffee price insurance is relatively insensitive to 
changes in maize production variability. 
vi We chose .9 as the “upper bound” for the coefficient of relative risk aversion since, for 
most cases, utility was still positive over the range of simulations run.  Because our 
representative households are so poor, and because of the mean-variance specification, 
holding relative risk aversion constant leads to a utility specification that is quite sensitive 
to changes in coffee price variability, particular for households with large coffee shares.   
vii We also ran three month contracts, but the willingness to pay is never greater than the 
fair value. 
viii Most of the interviews took place between during the last two weeks of December and 
the month of January; hereafter, we will refer to these as expected prices for 12 months 
ahead. 
ix This latter method of recovering willingness to pay forces output to remain the same – 
clearly if the price per unit price of insurance actually increases, less output will be 
produced (which is why we are running this set of scenarios to begin with!).   
Nonetheless, this would represent the next step in iterating to a solution; the results are 
thus upper bound estimates of the willingness to pay when increasing the discount rate or 
increasing expected contract values.  
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 Table 1:  Forecasted Prices 
  12 Mth  9 Mth  6 Month 
World  Price     
   Forecast Price  40.33  43.25  43.18 
   Forecast Volatility  54%  43%  33% 
Domestic  Price     
   Forecast Price  32.73  36.48  39.23 
   Forecast Volatility  61%  57%  44% 
 
 
Table 2: Actual Prices, December 2001 and December 2002 
  December, 2001  December, 2002 
World Price  42.21  46.55 
Domestic Producer Price  33.93  40.69 




Table 3: Total Household Income (in US $) and Income Shares 
  Total Income % Coffee  %Maize %Other  Crops %Off-Farm 
Poor          
  Low % Income from Coffee  400 10 20 30 40
  High % of Income from Coffee  500 65 5 15 15
          
Medium          
  Low % Income from Coffee  1200 10 10 25 55
  High % of Income from Coffee  1900 60 15 10 15
          
Rich          
  Low % Income from Coffee  2400 10 0 30 60






Table 4:  Willingness to Pay, World Price Contracts, CRR=.9 
        
6 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  48.9  64.7  74.2 
   High % of Income from Coffee  95.8  96.5  97.4 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  45.2  62.2  72.4 
   High % of Income from Coffee  93.8  95.1  96.2 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  46.4  63.0  72.9 
   High % of Income from Coffee  85.0  89.1  91.9 
        
9 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  109.1 105.7 103.6 
   High % of Income from Coffee  162.8 146.2 135.5 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  66.4  74.1  79.5 
   High % of Income from Coffee  125.2 118.4 114.3 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  67.8  75.2  80.3 
   High % of Income from Coffee  114.8 110.6 108.2 
        
12 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  111.4 108.2 109.4 
   High % of Income from Coffee  178.7 162.0 150.2 
      
 Medium     
   Low % Income from Coffee  107.6 105.1 103.4 
   High % of Income from Coffee  176.8 160.4 148.8 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  107.5 105.0 103.3 
   High % of Income from Coffee  129.4 122.0 139.4 
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 Table 5: Willingness to Pay, World Price Contracts, CRR=.4 
Willingness to Pay as a Percent of Fair Value Premium; Assume CRR=.4   
        
6 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  42.4  60.3  70.9 
   High % of Income from Coffee  62.6  74.0  80.9 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  40.5  59.0  70.0 
   High % of Income from Coffee  62.6  73.9  80.8 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  40.9  59.3  70.2 
   High % of Income from Coffee  58.3  71.1  78.8 
        
9 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  101.3  99.8 98.9 
   High % of Income from Coffee  124.6 117.4 112.7 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  60.5  69.7  75.9 
   High % of Income from Coffee  86.7  89.4  91.4 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  61.2  70.2  76.3 
   High % of Income from Coffee  82.1  86.0  88.7 
        
12 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  102.3 100.8 103.3 
   High % of Income from Coffee  132.2 124.7 119.5 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  100.6  99.5 98.7 
   High % of Income from Coffee  131.9 124.5 119.3 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  100.6  99.5 98.7 






 Table 6:  Willingness to Pay, Domestic Price Contracts, CRR=.9 
Willingness to Pay as a Percent of Fair Value Premium; Assume CRR=.9   
9 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  80.0 79.5 79.4
   High % of Income from Coffee  190.2 162.3 144.2
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  33.9 45.3 53.1
   High % of Income from Coffee  165.3 144.1 130.5
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  34.4 45.7 53.4
   High % of Income from Coffee  137.5 123.3 114.3
        
12 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  124.7 115.0 111.0
   High % of Income from Coffee  293.5 249.9 222.0
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  91.1 73.9 62.1
   High % of Income from Coffee  289.6 246.5 218.9
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  103.0 97.7 95.3















 Table 7:  Willingness to Pay, World Price Contracts, CRR=.9 
Willingness to Pay as a Percent of Fair Value Premium; Assume CRR=.4   
        
9 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor      
   Low % Income from Coffee  59.7 64.2 67.4
   High % of Income from Coffee  108.8 101.1 96.3
        
 Medium      
   Low % Income from Coffee  21.3 35.8 45.6
   High % of Income from Coffee  79.9 79.9 80.1
        
 Rich      
   Low % Income from Coffee  21.2 35.7 45.6
   High % of Income from Coffee  67.7 70.7 73.0
        
12 Month Contract  Strike Price     
   10% Below   At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  91.5 88.5 89.2
   High % of Income from Coffee  169.0 150.4 139.2
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  78.7 72.2 68.3
   High % of Income from Coffee  167.0 148.7 137.6
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  84.6 82.9 83.0
   High % of Income from Coffee  131.1 119.6 131.5
 
 











Poor        
  Low % Income from Coffee  30  42  40  24.7 
  High % of Income from Coffee  32  48  50  104.2 
        
Medium        
  Low % Income from Coffee  36  39  5  68.2 
  High % of Income from Coffee  37  48  26  144.5 
        




 Table 9a: Willingness to Pay, Subjective Price, CRR=.9 
        
12 Month Contract  Strike Price:     
   10% Below  At Expected Price  10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  -79.80  -45.49  -17.67 
   High % of Income from Coffee  -158.96  -106.81  -69.71 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  -29.87  -19.97  -13.33 
   High % of Income from Coffee  -141.24  -93.04  -58.66 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  -157.96  -106.98  -70.89 





Table 9b: Willingness to Pay, Subjective Price, CRR=.4: 
Subjective Price,  Actual Variance      
        
12 Month Contract  Strike Price    
   10% BelowAt Expected Price10% Above 
 Poor       
   Low % Income from Coffee  -18.50  2.55  20.77 
   High % of Income from Coffee  -51.39  -22.50  -1.29 
        
 Medium       
   Low % Income from Coffee  73.61  61.14  52.50 
   High % of Income from Coffee  -43.83  -16.69  3.30 
        
 Rich       
   Low % Income from Coffee  -130.56  -85.49  -53.45 
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